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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants ("SUMMARY
JUDGMENT")1 is a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken
under Utah R. App. P. 3(a). The Utah Supreme Court had original
appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under Section 78-2-2(3)(j),
Utah Code.

Pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code, the Supreme

Court transferred this appeal to the Court of Appeals, which now
has jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The only issue properly presented for review is whether
the trial court erred in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment ("DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION") dated February
27, 1997. R. 473-475.

The standard of appellate review for this

issue is accurately stated in Brief of Appellant ("RORY'S
BRIEF"), p. 2, as being a review for correctness.
For the reasons set forth in Appellees' Motion to
Dismiss Parts of Appellant's Appeal2 dated December 18, 1997, the

x

The document, R. 884-892, which contains the SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, R. 887-888, was signed by Bryce K. Bryner, District
Judge, on October 29, 1997, and entered on October 30, 1997. The
document also contains Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment ("ORDER DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOTION") R. 888-890; Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Leave
to File an Amended Complaint ("ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND") R.
890-891; and Order Denying Motion to Strike Affidavit of Lyman
Grover ("ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT") R. 891-892.
2

The Utah Supreme Court deferred ruling on this motion by
order dated January 5, 1998.
1

denial by the trial court of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (»RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION"), R. 204-205,
is not a final, appealable order and there is no standard of
appellate review.

Likewise the denial of Plaintiff's Motion for

Leave to File an Amended Complaint ("MOTION TO AMEND"), R. 687688, dated March 6, 1997, is not a final order.

However, should

this court consider the denial of the MOTION TO AMEND in deciding
whether the trial court correctly entered the SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
the standard of review, as set forth in RORY'S BRIEF, p. 2, is
whether the trial court abused its discretion.

The other issues

mentioned in RORY'S BRIEF, p. 1, are not separate appealable
issues.3
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
A.

The pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution is as follows:

"...

[N]or shall any

state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. . . ."

U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1.

3

These other issues are: Impartiality of the
disciplinarian; vague and ambiguous policies; and deprival of
liberty interest. RORY'S BRIEF makes no other mention of or
argument concerning the liberty interest issue. In any event,
the due process required is the same irrespective of whether a
property or a liberty interest is involved. Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 572 (1975). While RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 1-2, does not
assert that the validity of the ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVIT is one of the issues, RORY's Notice of Appeal dated
November 24, 1997 does state that an appeal is taken from that
order. R. 903-904. DISTRICT also asserts this order is not final
and appealable.
2

B.

The pertinent part of U.R.C.P. 56 (1998) is:

"The

judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law."
C.

The pertinent part of U.R.C.P. 15 (1998) is:

(a) Amendments . . . .
[A] party may amend
his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party . . . .
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings.

D.

The pertinent part of Utah R. App. P. 24 (1998)

(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented
for review, including for each issue: the standard
of appellate review with supporting authority; and
. . . (B) a statement of grounds for seeking
review of an issue not presented in the trial
court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This case involves a ten day suspension of a student
for use of marijuana during a school activity.

The trial court

concluded Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), is determinative
and the due process requirements of Goss were satisfied by the
undisputed facts showing that the student " . . . was given notice

3

of the charges and evidence against him and an opportunity to
present his side of the story in an informal setting."

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, R. 8 87.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
1.

Plaintiff (Appellant) Rory J. Atcitty

("RORY"), acting through his natural parent, Roger Atcitty
("ROGER"), filed the Complaint ("COMPLAINT") on May 17, 1996. R.
1-5.

The sole claim (the "ORIGINAL CLAIM") was, that in

suspending RORY for ten days without providing the hearing to
which RORY claims he was entitled, Defendants (Appellees) Board
of Education of the San Juan County School District ("BOARD") and
Lyman Grover ("GROVER") (BOARD and GROVER are collectively
"DISTRICT") deprived RORY of his property right to an education
in violation of the due process provisions of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.4
4

H 9 of the COMPLAINT, p. 3, reads:
"9. At the time of and prior to the expulsion, Defendants
failed to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to present a
defense to the charges, failed to afford Plaintiff and his
parents a due process hearing or procedure to contest the
expulsion by presenting evidence and confronting the child's
accusers, and refused the parents' request to reinstate the child
in school pending such a hearing. Defendants further denied
Plaintiff the right .to present circumstances in mitigation of the
harsh penalty imposed by the expulsion. The expulsion
effectively terminates the child's right to participate in honors
and other end-of-the-year activities and deprives him of the free
appropriate public education to which he is entitled from the
District." R. 3.
H 11 of the COMPLAINT, p. 3, reads:
"11. Plaintiff is entitled to a due process hearing
concerning his expulsion. Defendants' denial of the right to a
due process hearing constitutes a denial of procedural due
4

COMPLAINT makes no claim GROVER was partial, BOARD policies were
vague and ambiguous, DISTRICT violated state statutes in failing
to adopt proper policies or to provide home schooling during the
suspension period, or RORY was deprived of a liberty interest
(the foregoing are collectively the "NEW CLAIMS").
2.

A scheduling and management conference was

held on August 27, 1996, resulting in the entry of the Scheduling
and Management Order ("SCHEDULING ORDER") dated August 30, 1996,
which provided discovery would be completed by December 27, 1996;
dispositive motions would be filed on or before January 31, 1997;
and trial would commence on March 18, 1997. R. 159-160.

On

motion of RORY, the Amended Scheduling and Management Order was
entered on February 20, 1997, which extended the date for filing
dispositive motions and reset the trial for May 28, 1998. R.

process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution." R. 3.
The pertinent parts of ff 14 and 15 of the COMPLAINT, p. 4,
are :
"14. Plaintiff is entitled to a . . . permanent injunction
against the Defendants enjoining from excluding him from school
and school activities without first complying with appropriate
due process procedures. Plaintiff is entitled to this remedy
because (1) he has suffered irreparable injury by not being
afforded the right to go to school, receive an adequate
education, and participate in other educational activities . .
. . " R. 4 .
"15. Plaintiff is further entitled to a declaratory judgment
that the Defendants have violated the constitutional provisions
in the manner alleged herein." R. 4.
% 1 in the prayer on p. 5 of the COMPLAINT reads:
"1. Declare and determine that the Defendants are in
violation of the constitutional provisions alleged herein." R.
5.
5

422-424.
3.

Discovery was completed as follows:
a.

DISTRICT took the depositions of RORY

and ROGER on July 19, 1996 and RORY took the deposition of GROVER
on December 17, 1996.

R. 939 at p. 1, 940 at p. 1, 941 at p. 1.

b.

Protective Order No. 1 ("PROTECTIVE

ORDER NO. 1") was entered on September 26, 1996.
c.

R. 163-170.

All required documents were made

available by DISTRICT to RORY on or before October 16, 1996.
Certificate of Service of Plaintiff's First Request for
Documents, R. 52; Defendants' Response to First Requests for
Documents, R. 84; PROTECTIVE ORDER NO. 1, R. 163-170; Certificate
with Respect to Documents Requested in Request No. 2 of
Plaintiff's First Requests for Documents, R. 181-182.

See

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to File an Amended Complaint ("DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING
MOTION TO AMEND"), R. 758-759; Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("RORY'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MEMO"), R. 219.
4.

On February 14, 1997, RORY filed RORY'S

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, R. 2 04, and RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MEMO, R. 2 06, in which RORY asserted, for the first time the NEW

6

CLAIMS,5 R. 219-220, 226-230, other than the claim DISTRICT had
failed to provide required home schooling during the suspension
period ("HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM"). 6
5.

On February 27, 1997, DISTRICT'S SUMMARY

JUDGMENT MOTION, Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment ("DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO"), and
Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment ("DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING RORY'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT") were filed.

R. 473, 476, 581.

The latter

document pointed out that the NEW CLAIMS raised in RORY'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MEMO had not been pleaded.
6.

R. 591-593.

On March 6, 1997, RORY filed MOTION TO AMEND

seeking leave to file a First Amended Complaint, pleading for the
first time, the NEW CLAIMS, other than the HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM.

5

Up to this time the parties and the court proceeded as if
ORIGINAL CLAIM was the only issue in this lawsuit. See supra %
B.l, pp. 4-5; Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, R. 15-21, (RORY
alleges he was suspended without due process when he was "never
afforded even a minimal right such as a right to have the
opportunity to rebut allegations prior to the decision of the
suspension," and "he was not given the opportunity to present his
side of the story . . ..") R. 16-17; Defendants' Reply to
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Protective Order (stating "this case focuses solely on whether
the District provided the Plaintiff with the process due him
under the law in connection with the disciplinary action taken")
(emphasis original) R. 130-131.
6

The HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM was not made at all by RORY in the
lower court and is asserted for the first time on appeal. RORY'S
BRIEF, pp. 26-27.
7

R. 687-688, 818-823.
7.
GROVER AFFIDAVIT.

On March 17, 1997, RORY moved to strike
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of

Lyman Grover Submitted in Support of Defendants' Summary Judgment
Motion and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment ("MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT").
C.

R. 722-723.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
On October 30, 1997, the SUMMARY JUDGMENT (which

determined RORY had no cause of action against DISTRICT and
dismissed the COMPLAINT with prejudice) R. 887-888, the ORDER
DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (which denied RORY'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION) R. 888-890, the ORDER DENYING RORY'S
MOTION TO AMEND (which denied MOTION TO AMEND) R. 890-891, and
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT (which denied the MOTION
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT) R. 891-892, were entered.
D.

R. 884.7

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Since the central question is whether the undisputed
facts show RORY was afforded the hearing required by Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) the critical facts are those which

7

The grounds for the above judgment and orders, as well as
the reasoning of the trial court, are set forth in the judgment
and orders (R. 884-892) as well as in Ruling on Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 804-807); Ruling on Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 814-816) ; Ruling on
Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (R. 811-813) ;
Ruling on Motion to Strike Affidavit of Lyman Grover (R. 808810); and Ruling on Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Summary
Judgment Order (R. 880-882).
8

show what transpired between GROVER and RORY.

The Statement of

Facts on pp. 5-11 of RORY'S BRIEF does not address what happened,
but rather focuses on what RORY claims should have taken place.
To show what actually occurred, DISTRICT submits there is no
genuine issue as to the following material facts:
1.

RORY was a student at Whitehorse High School

("SCHOOL") which was administered by BOARD with GROVER as the
Principal.

COMPLAINT, KK 1, 2, 3, R. 1-2; Answer dated May 31,

1996, % I.A., R. 46-47; Affidavit of Lyman Grover ("GROVER
AFFIDAVIT"), i[ 2, R. 433-434.
2.

On or about May 4, 1996, RORY and other

members of the SCHOOL band traveled to Durango, Colorado ("BAND
TRIP").

Deposition of Rory Atcitty ("RORY DEPOSITION"), R. 941

at pp. 5-6.
3.

On Friday, May 10, 1996, Liz Sharpe

("SHARPE"), the Assistant Principal at SCHOOL, informed GROVER of
an incident of marijuana smoking (the "INCIDENT") on the BAND
TRIP.

Because GROVER was not then available, it was decided to

begin an investigation on Monday, May 13, 1996. Deposition of
Lyman Grover ("GROVER DEPOSITION"), R. 940 at pp. 7-9; GROVER
AFFIDAVIT, f 3, R. 434.
4.

On May 13 the following occurred:
a.

Lena Begay, the parenting specialist,

identified RORY and other students as being involved in the

9

INCIDENT.

GROVER began an investigation, calling in the students

"to ask them to tell their side of the story."

GROVER

DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 9-12.
b.

GROVER telephoned ROGER and requested

that he come to SCHOOL to discuss a matter "involving [his] son,
Rory".

ROGER asked, "Can you just tell me what the problem is?"

GROVER responded, "This is dealing with marijuana."

GROVER

DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 12-13; Deposition of Roger Atcitty
("ROGER DEPOSITION"), R. 939 at pp. 4-6; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 4.b,
R. 434.
c.

Later, ROGER contacted SCHOOL and

requested that he be allowed to talk with RORY prior to meeting
with GROVER.

Upon arrival, ROGER informed RORY of the

allegations involving marijuana against him.

In addition, ROGER

told RORY, "It's a serious charge . . . From now on - - I want
you to just not answer any questions from now on or until you get
approval from me . . .."

ROGER DEPOSITION, R. 939 at pp. 6-8;

RORY DEPOSITION, R. 941 at pp. 25-27; GROVER DEPOSITION, pp. 1315, 23.
d.
SHARPE.

ROGER and his wife met with GROVER and

GROVER informed ROGER his investigation indicated RORY

was involved in "distributing marijuana at the school and during
school activities".

ROGER told GROVER that "with the seriousness

of the charges allegated (sic) against [RORY], I instructed . . .

10

[RORY] not to answer any more questions from hereon out."

ROGER

indicated he had talked to his attorney, and inquired as to the
source of the information implicating RORY.

ROGER was told the

sources were the other students involved, and some parents,
including Lena Begay.

ROGER questioned the allegations,

indicated the report from Lena Begay was politically motivated,
the allegations were hearsay and GROVER had no proof RORY had
been involved.

ROGER DEPOSITION, R. 93 9 at p. 7; GROVER

DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 15-16, 18, 20, 23; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, %
4.d., R. 434.
5.

On May 14, 1996, the following occurred:
a.

GROVER obtained written statements from

each of the students, except RORY, involved in the INCIDENT.
GROVER attempted to talk with RORY and asked RORY to make a
written statement about the INCIDENT.

RORY refused to answer any

questions because "my father told me not to tell you anything."
GROVER repeatedly requested that RORY tell what happened.
refused, stating his dad told him not to say anything.
asked and was permitted to call his father.

RORY

RORY

In this telephone

conversation ROGER told RORY, "'until I get there, don't answer
any questions.'"

GROVER DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 22-25; RORY

DEPOSITION, R. 941 at pp. 29-32; ROGER DEPOSITION, R. 939 at 9;
GROVER AFFIDAVIT, ff 5.a., 5.b., R. 434-435.
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b.

Upon arrival, ROGER, RORY, GROVER and

SHARPE met in GROVER's office.

GROVER again informed ROGER and

RORY of the marijuana allegations against RORY and the evidence
came from the others involved.

ROGER stated he had instructed

RORY not to answer any questions because of the seriousness of
the allegations and that if the investigation by GROVER was to
clear RORY's name, RORY would give a statement with names of the
others involved.
lawsuit.

Otherwise, ROGER would proceed with the

GROVER indicated he would continue his investigation.

ROGER DEPOSITION, R. 939 at p. 9; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, K 5.C., R.
434-435.
6.

On May 16, 1996, the following occurred:
a.

GROVER determined, based on his

investigation, that four students (including RORY) smoked
marijuana on the BAND TRIP and should be suspended for ten days.
GROVER gathered to his office RORY and the other available,
involved students.

Davis Fillfred ("FILLFRED"), a Navajo Police

Officer (who had been notified by GROVER), was also present.
GROVER informed the students that based on investigation,
interviews and written statements, he had determined that four of
the students, including RORY, had used marijuana on the BAND TRIP
and would be suspended for ten days.
of the suspension.

GROVER explained the terms

GROVER told the students that FILLFRED was

present because their acts constituted criminal conduct and he

12

was obligated to inform the police.

FILLFRED told the students

they were accused of using drugs and questioned them.

He asked

one of the students where he had gotten the marijuana and the
student indicated it came from RORY.
never had it."

RORY responded, ". . . 1

This was the first time GROVER heard RORY deny

any of the allegations.

Prior to this time, when GROVER

attempted to talk to him, RORY always refused to speak, neither
admitting or denying, except to indicate ROGER had told him not
to answer any questions.

GROVER DEPOSITION, R. 94 0 at pp. 3 0-38,

43-44; RORY DEPOSITION, R. 941 at pp. 35-40; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, Uf
6, 9, R. 435-437.
b.

FILLFRED left.

GROVER contacted ROGER

and informed him RORY had been suspended and ROGER needed to come
and get RORY.

When ROGER and his wife arrived, GROVER invited

them and RORY into his office to explain the terms of the
suspension and how it could be shortened by participation in a
drug rehabilitation program.

Rejecting the invitation, ROGER

stated he was only there to pick up RORY and sign any necessary
papers.

Again GROVER invited them into his office to discuss the

suspension and again they refused.

GROVER provided ROGER with

the Student Behavior Referral8 and again tried to explain to RORY
and his parents the terms of the suspension.

ROGER said, "[H]e

didn't want to hear all that; that he just wanted to pick up his

This document can be found at R. 42 0 and 576.
13

son and go home and [GROVER would] be hearing from his attorney."
RORY and his parents left.

GROVER DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 39-

42; ROGER DEPOSITION, R. 939 at pp. 10-13; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, %<h
12-13, R. 437-438.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly granted DISTRICT'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION and denied RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.

The

controlling authority is Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) and
its progeny.

The due process required, in the context of a

suspension of ten days or less, is notice of the charge,
explanation of the evidence if the charge is denied, and
opportunity to be heard, all with a minimum of formality.
requirements were satisfied in this case.
to Goss and ignores its progeny.

These

RORY pays lip service

RORY urges the court to apply

another and more exacting standard.

RORY's arguments the

DISTRICT'S policies are vague and ambiguous in noncompliance of
state law; GROVER was biased because he acted in some law
enforcement capacity; failure to provide home-schooling services
tainted the hearing process; and affected liberty interests
require additional due process must be rejected because they are
raised improperly.

These arguments should also be rejected

because RORY has not established facts to support them and the
law does not recognize such due process requirements in the
context of suspension of ten days or less.
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RORY's arguments he

was not provided sufficient opportunities to be heard either as
to the misconduct or in mitigation of punishment are without
merit.

RORY was provided several opportunities to be heard; he

waived or failed to take advantage of any of them when he refused
to talk to GROVER about the INCIDENT.

Finally, RORY's suggestion

that additional procedures were due in this case is not supported
by the facts of record and case law directly on point.
The trial court correctly denied the MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVIT.

There is no inconsistency between the GROVER

AFFIDAVIT and the GROVER DEPOSITION with respect to the alleged
dual role of GROVER, and the meetings between RORY, ROGER and
GROVER on May 16, 1996.
The trial court did not abuse it's discretion in
denying the MOTION TO AMEND.

The MOTION TO AMEND sought to

expand the issues in this case in an untimely matter which would
have caused great prejudice to the DISTRICT.
ARGUMENT
RORY's sole claim is he was not provided due process
with respect to his ten day suspension for use of marijuana on
the BAND TRIP.9

This court must address two questions.

what due process is required.

First,

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

481 (1972); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577 (1975).

Second, was

the required due process provided.

9

See the definition of ORIGINAL CLAIM, supra, p. 4.
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I.

DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUSPENSION OF
TEN DAYS OR LESS ARE LIMITED.

Both parties agree the seminal case on due process
associated with student suspension of ten days or less is Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) .10

In Goss, several Ohio high school

students, who were suspended for up to ten days without a
hearing, sued school officials, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violating their constitutional due process rights.

For the first

time, in Goss, the United States Supreme Court addressed "short
suspensions, not exceeding 10 days."

Goss at 584.

Goss is still

the law today and state appellate courts, as well as lower
federal courts have, without exception, applied the holding and
rationale of Goss to all suspensions of ten days or less.

Smith

v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 1997); Breeding v. Driscoll, 82
F.3d 383 (11th Cir. 1996); Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14 (1st
Cir. 1995); Paredes by Koppenhoffer v. Curtis, 864 F.2d 426 (6th
Cir. 1988); Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit School District No.
2., 826 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1987); Arrington v. Ebberhart, 920 F.
Supp. 1208 (M.D. Alabama 1996); Heller v. Hodgin, 928 F. Supp.
789 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Bonner v. Lincoln Parish School Board, 685
So.2d 432 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1996); Miller v. Board of Education of
Caroline County, 690 A.2d 557 (Md. App. 1997); Byrd v. Irmo High
School, 468 S.E.2d 861 (S.C. 1996); Wood v. Henry Public Schools,

See RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 2-3.
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495 S.E.2d 255 (Va. 1998).
Goss made it clear the due process requirements to
suspend a student for ten days are very limited.11

"The

fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to
be heard."

Goss, 419 U.S. at 579 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234

U.S. 385 (1914) .

The Court held that in connection with a

suspension of ten days or less, "due process requires ... that
the student be given oral or written notice of the charges
against him, and if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his
side of the story. "

.Id. at 581 (emphasis added) .

The notice of charges can be oral or written.

Id.;

Breeding, 82 F.2d at 386 (telephone call satisfied the
requirements of the due process clause); Donovan, 68 F.3d. at 17;
Arrington, 920 F. Supp. at 1217; Smith, 129 F.3d at 428; Heller,
928 F. Supp. at 795; Bonner, 658 So.2d at 435; Byrd, 468 S.E.2d
at 867-868.
The required explanation is just an explanation and
nothing more.

Heller, 928 F. Supp. at 793, 795 (mother of

student was told by teacher that teacher had heard student utter

1:L

The court reiterated its prior admonition that "public
education ... is committed to the control of state and local
authorities." Goss, 419 U.S. at 578 (citing Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)). Deference is traditionally
afforded by the courts to those administering the public
education system. See, Miller, 690 A.2d at 559, 561.
17

the obscene epithet - the charge giving rise to the suspension);
Breeding, 82 F.3d at 386 (school administrator only need to tell
a student what they heard or saw).
The opportunity is informal.

Opportunity for the

student to tell his side of the story is all that is needed.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 583.

In "the great majority of cases the

disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with
the student minutes after it has occurred."

.Id. at 582.

Indeed,

the court characterized the required due process in one part of
the opinion as "an informal give-and-take between student and
disciplinarian."

Id. at 584.

The student is not entitled "to

secure counsel, confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting
the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of
the incident".
435.

Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; Bonner, 685 S.2d at 434-

The student is not entitled to know the identity of and

confront his accusers, or written statements of informants.
Paredes# 864 F.2d at 429; Bonner, 685 So.2d at 434-435.

"There

need be no delay between the time notice is given and the time of
the hearing."

Goss 419 U.S. at 582; Breeding, 82 F.3d at 386

("The dictates of Goss are clear and extremely limited.

Briefly

stated, once school administrators tell a student what they heard
or saw, ask why they heard or saw it, and allow a brief response,
a student has received all the process that the Fourteenth
Amendment demands."); Smith, 129 F.3d at 428; Byrd, 468 S.E.2d at
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867-866.

The opportunity to be heard satisfies Goss even if

provided after the suspension decision is made and before the
suspension takes effect.

Heller, 928 F. Supp. at 795.

Courts have determined the Goss standards apply to
alcohol and drug possession and/or use cases.

Paredes, 864 F.2d

426; Arrinqton, 920 F. Supp. 1208; Bonner, 685 So.2d 432; Miller,
690 A.2d 557; Byrd, 468 S.E.2d 861.

In Arrinqton, school

officials received a report from another student that plaintiff
possessed marijuana.

Plaintiff was taken to the principal's

office and informed of the accusations against him and read his
juvenile rights by the sheriff deputy on duty at the school.

The

plaintiff declined to make any statement and requested his
parents be contacted.

The father came to school and checked the

plaintiff out of school.

The same day, by letter, the principal

suspended plaintiff for 10 days.

The court determined the Goss

standard of due process applied and stated:
Plaintiff was given an opportunity to make any
statement that he wished to make in his own defense
but he declined that opportunity. Hence not only
did the plaintiff have notice of the charges against
him he was also afforded an opportunity to present
his version of the facts before he was suspended
from school. As a result the court concludes that
the defendants have complied with the due process
requirements for short term suspension as set forth
in Goss.
Arrinqton, 920 F. Supp. at 1217.
The Goss standards also apply to missing final exams
and year-end activities, Lamb v. Panhandle Community Unit School
19

District No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1987), and social
events and interscholastic athletics.

Donovan v. Ritchie, 68

F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995).
DISTRICT has not found a case since Goss, dealing with
a ten day or less suspension and where a student was given any
kind of opportunity to state his position, in which the court did
not find the Goss requirements were met.
case holding due process was not provided.

RORY does not cite any
It appears any sort

of meeting between student and disciplinarian, where the student
has an opportunity to speak, will suffice.
II.

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL
FACT AND THOSE FACTS SHOW THAT THE DISTRICT
COMPLIED WITH THE GOSS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS.

RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 38-45, asserts that there are
disputed issues of material fact.

A careful reading, however,

reveals RORY does not dispute any of the facts set forth herein.
See supra, pp. 8-13.12

There is no hint RORY controverts the

following ultimate facts:
A.

On May 13, 1996, RORY and ROGER knew RORY was

charged with the possession and/or distribution of marijuana on
the BAND TRIP.

Even though they could have done so, RORY and

ROGER refused to talk to GROVER about the charge, thus not
denying the same and thus rejecting the opportunity to give

12

RORY could hardly do otherwise because the key facts set
forth herein with respect to notice and opportunity come from the
depositions of ROGER and RORY.
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GROVER RORY's side of the story.
B>

^g a j_ n

thing occurred again.

on

See supra, pp. 9-11.

May 14 f 1996, essentially the same

This time, however, GROVER talked with

RORY himself and requested RORY make a statement about the
INCIDENT and, even though RORY had not yet denied the charges so
as to give rise to an obligation on the part of GROVER to explain
the evidence, GROVER provided an explanation by telling RORY the
evidence came from 1 -<• other students :i nvc 1 ved.

As was the case

on May 13, RORY expressly refused to make a statement.

See

supra, pp. 11-12.
C.

Lastly,

'

•

same thing

happened a third time except RORY denied the charge after one of
the other students named him as the provider of the marijuana.
RORY refused

anything else about the matte:,

See supra,

pp. 12-14.
RORY's argument there are disputed issues of material
fact does not challenge the above,

>-•• --v- argues there are

disputed issues of fact involving RORY's right to be heard in
mitigation of punishment; whether GROVER was an impartial
disciplinarian; whether RORY 1 i. a.c:i notice c f 11 le :i : i i] es a i id
procedures and time and place of hearing; and with respect to the
GROVER AFFIDAVIT.

See RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 38-45.

RORY contends ENHANCED DUE PROCESS (defined
hereinafter), See infra, pp. 23-24, must be provided to comply
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with the law.

RORY»S BRIEF, 5-11, 38-45; Plaintiff's Response

Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion ("RORY'S
MEMO OPPOSING DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT"), %% 2-7, 11, pp. 1-7,
R. 697-703.

Compliance with the law is to be determined by the

court from what actually occurred; that is, by what was said and
what was done.

Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P.2d

568, 571 (Utah App. 1992); Provo City Corp. v. Werner, 810 P.2d
469, 471 (Utah App. 1991) .

The parties do not agree on the

outcome of this case because the parties dispute what the
applicable law requires, not because they dispute what was said
and done.
There is no genuine issue that RORY and ROGER were
given the required notice of the allegations, explanation of the
evidence and opportunity to be heard on May 13, 1996, again on
May 14, 1996, and lastly on May 16, 1996.

RORY, acting under

direction of his father and perhaps mistakenly believing he was
entitled to something more, declined to avail himself of the
opportunity to be heard.

Due process only required DISTRICT to

provide an opportunity for RORY to be heard, it does not, nor can
it, mandate RORY to avail himself of the opportunity.

Arrington,

920 F. Supp. at 1217.
III.

RORY'S CLAIMS TO ENHANCED DUE PROCESS ARE
WITHOUT MERIT.

DISTRICT now turns to respond to the main thrust of
RORY's argument, namely that due process over and above that
22

required by Goss was necessary in this case.

RORY's definition

of enhanced due process ("ENHANCED DUE PROCESS") includes: 1)
timely and adequate notice of when the opportunity to be heard
would be given, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 18, 22, 33, 38, 43; 2) notice
which would alert RORY

allegations against him, RORY'S

BRIEF, p. 16; 3) notice which would alert RORY of his suspension,
RORY'S BRIEF, pp. _, __, 19-20; 4) explanation of disciplinary
process including suspension procedures

hearing procedures,

RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 8-9, 16, 18, 20, 38, 43; 5) definite time to
respond before action taken, RORY'S BRIEF, p. 16; 6)
identification and explanation of evidence against: RORY, RORY'S
BRIEF, p. 9, 19-20, 33-34; 7) opportunity to prepare defense of
allegations, RORY'S BRIEF, p. 22; 8) separate opportunity to be
heard in mitigati

:

.MM:

3 4 - 4 2 ; Oral A r g u m e n t Transcript

- F\

("TRANSCRIPT"

, 25-2 6,
, 93 8 at p p . 9,

29; 9) right to confront accusers, RORY'S BRIEF, p p . 2 4 , 33-34,
36; TRANSCRIPT

equiring GROVER to provide

all evidence, including names of individuals p r o v i d i n g evidence
and s t a t e m e n t s , to RORY and p a r e n t s , RORY'S BRIEF, p p . 2 0 , 2 4 ,
3 4 ; TRANSCRIPT

mpartial

disciplinarian, RORY'S BRIEF, p p . 2 8 - 3 1 , 4 2 ; T R A N S C R I P T , R. 938
at p . 1 1 ; 12) p r e s e n c e of p a r e n t s , RORY'S BRIEF, p p .
TRANSCRIPT,

i, 3 3 , 3 6 ;

represented b y an

attorney, RORY'S BRIEF, p . 3 7 ; TRANSCRIPT,
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938 at p . 1 2 ;

14) prior to a "hearing", a warning to parents and RORY this is
the student's only chance to tell his story and the consequences
of not discussing the matter, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 8-9, 17, 19-21;
TRANSCRIPT, R. 938 at pp. 7, 28; 15) information about possible
punishments, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 8-10; TRANSCRIPT, R. 938 at p. 29;
16) notice of right to a post-suspension parent conference,
RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 8-10, 27; 17) advice about alternate-education
services, RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 9-10, 26, 27.
Although RORY claimed his desire for enhanced due
process is "still very rudimentary . . . [and] not a full blown
trial", TRANSCRIPT, R. 938 at p. 12, the foregoing suggests
otherwise.

RORY combines, in his argument, the above under the

headings hereinafter addressed, stating there are issues of fact
with respect to each.
III.A.

THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A SEPARATE HEARING IN
MITIGATION OF PUNISHMENT FOR A SUSPENSION
OF TEN DAYS OR LESS.

RORY argues he was entitled to two, different
opportunities to be heard--one to be heard relative to his
misconduct, and another to be heard in mitigation of punishment.
RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 25-26, 39-42.
withstand scrutiny.

RORY's position does not

First, Goss does not mandate a second

hearing with respect to mitigation but rather says only one
opportunity to be heard is required, which was afforded in this
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See supra, Points I, II, pp. 15-22.13

case.

Second, the cases RORY cites miss the mark.

For

example, the Lamb court declares an opportunity to present an
argument in mitigation of punishment is required only when
expulsion is involved.

826 F.2d at 528.

In fact, the Lamb court

concluded "because Lamb was put on notice" and given an
opportunity to present his version of the facts "before he was
suspended . . . , the defendants cot np] :i ed w :i tl I Goss . "

Id.

Similarly, Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1975)
mentions the right to be heard in mitigation of punishment, but
does not identify that as a separate ai id ::l i sti net opportunity to
be heard, and again the case arises in the context of a
suspension exceeding ten days or expulsion.

Jd. at 747.14

The

irony in RORY's position is his tui\ illingnesf * > acknowledge his
own refusal to speak with GROVER on at least three occasions was
the only thing that prevented his being heard on any matter,
including n:u t:igation.

13

See also RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 17-18 (" [T]he [May 14] meeting
was only used by Mr. Grover to ask questions about the alleged
incident"). Indeed, RORY acknowledges receiving at least three
opportunities to tell his story. See RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MEMO, pp. 3-6, UK 7.3., 7.k., R. 208-211; DISTRICT'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MEMO, ff I.H.2., I.H.4., I.J.8-10 R. 481-482, 484-485.
14

The other case RORY cites is even further off the mark.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) deals with the right to
be heard in the context of a parole revocation hearing and not a
student suspension of ten days or less.
25

III.B-

THIS CASE IS NOT AN UNUSUAL SITUATION
UNDER GOSS V. LOPEZ.

RORY argues this case is an "unusual situation" case in
which, as the Goss court stated in dicta, "something more than
the rudimentary procedures will be required."
584.

See RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 32, 37.

Goss, 419 U.S. at

RORY does not cite a case

finding an "unusual situation,"15 but does assert this is
"unusual" because of the alleged dual role of GROVER, RORY'S
BRIEF, pp. 28-32, and the alleged vagueness and ambiguous
policies of BOARD.16

RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 17, 22, 32.
III.B.I.

RORY's Impartiality Argument Lacks
Both a Factual and Legal Basis and
Must Therefore be Rejected.

RORY attempts to create a due process claim and a
disputed issue of fact by arguing he is entitled to the ENHANCED
DUE PROCESS because GROVER was partial.
42.

RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 28-31,

There are several fatal flaws to this argument.

First, as

the trial court determined, RORY did not plead this issue in his
COMPLAINT and therefore it was not properly before the trial
court.

ORDER DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT, % III.B., R. 88 9-

15

After diligent search, DISTRICT has not found an "unusual
situation" case.
16

Contrast this to RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO in which
RORY argued he was entitled to enhanced due process because of
the seriousness of the charge, the INCIDENT would be on his
record permanently, RORY's position as an honor society member
and student-body officer, and he was excluded from Honor Society
Dinner and other end-of-the year activities. R. 224.
26

8 90; ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, R. 8 90-891.
Second, RORY concludes GROVER was partial because he
was an agent of the police.
this fact with any evidence.
conclusion.17

However, RORY fails to establish
He simply jumps to the

In Lamb v. Manhandle Community Unit School

District No. 2, 826 F.2d 526, 529-530 (7th Cir. 1987), the
plaintiff alleged defects in due process because the board's
attorneys, the principal and the superintendent performed dual
roles, in which all three participated in the hearing and the
board's closed-session deliberations while plaintiff's counsel
was excluded from deliberat "

"!"!u cinn I determi ned no

constitutional violations occurred, because there was no evidence
of actual bias.
Third

ROR Y si lggests di le process precludes a school

official from conducting an investigation and determining the
punishment where criminal conduct is involved.

Courts have

clearly rejected this view,

tated "Requiring

.1 Goss

-

•

. . . an informal give-and-take . . . will add little to the
factfinding function where the disciplinarian himself has

17

Again RORY suggests GROVER performed two roles in this
incident, acting both as a school official and as agent of the
police by gathering information for law enforcement. There is no
evidence GROVER acted in any capacity other than as the principal
of SCHOOL. See GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 6, R. 435-436. RORY's
position which suggests anyone who provides information to the
police somehow becomes an agent of the police and subject to the
same constitutional restrictions is untenable. There is no
authority for such a proposition.
27

witnessed the conduct forming the basis for the charge."
419 U.S. at 584.

Goss,

The Lamb court affirmatively declared "a school

administrator involved in the initiation and investigation of
charges is not thereby disqualified from conducting a hearing on
the charges" nor does such participation otherwise violate due
process principles.

826 F.2d at 530 quoting Brewer v. Austin

Independent School District, 779 F.2d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 1985);
Baxter v. Round Lake Area School, 856 F. Supp. 438, 444 (N.D.
111. 1994) .

Here, RORY does not claim actual bias but simply

asserts "a reasonable person would question [GROVER's]
impartiality."

RORY'S BRIEF, p. 28.

RORY points only to

GROVER's involvement in the investigation and reporting to the
police to establish prejudice; this is clearly insufficient.
Indeed, virtually all reported student suspension cases involve
situations in which the "investigation" is performed by the
disciplinarian and often such cases also involve acts for which
the student could be charged with commission of a crime.
Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 387 (11th Cir. 1996); See
Baxter, 856 F. Supp. at 443; Lamb, 826 F.2d at 529-30.
Fourth, RORY provides no authority for the proposition
the disciplinarian must be impartial and that partiality is
established by reporting the results of a school investigation to
the police.
requirement.

RORY suggests Goss contains some impartiality
However, scrupulous review of the case fails to
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reveal even the mention of the word.

In fact, an impartiality

requirement only appears to rise to the level of constitutional
concern in the context of expulsion cases, as it is only in such
cases that it is mentioned.

See Snyder v. Farnsworth, 896 F.

Supp. 96, 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Baxter, 856 F. Supp. at 444 & n.
12.

Reporting student misconduct to the police following an

investigation and providing the fruits of the investigation to
police does

estab]

disciplinarian a,c

agent

I: the

police, or he was partial or any other violation of due process.
Arrington v. Eberhart, 920 F. Sup. 1208, 1232 (M.D. Ala. 1996);
Breeding, 82 F.3d at "' - '

See Byrd v. Irmo High School,

468 S.E.2d 861, 867-868 (S.*.. rjj^

In sum, RORY fails to

provide facts to establish GROVER was anything but impartial, and
provides no lega] authority supporting 1 i:i s position.18
This footnote discusses the cases cited in RORY'S BRIEF,
pp. 28-31, to support his impartiality-due process-agent of the
police argument. RORY's cases are not 10-day suspension cases
and simply have no application to this case. Vernonia School
Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), involves a fourth
amendment search and seizure challenge to random drug testing of
student athletes. M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.
111. 1977), is an expulsion case dealing with a challenge to an
allegedly illegal search, which clearly holds that the standards
generally applicable to criminal matters do not apply to searches
in a secondary school. The court found no due process violation
in this expulsion case, when a district had no formal guidelines
or procedures, no clearly defined punishment in the policy, and
no written guidelines for administrators to follow. Id.
New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), People v. Dilworth, 661
N.E.2d 310 (111. 1996), State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d. 586 (Ga.
1975), Commonwealth v. Cass, 666 A.2d 313 (Pa. Super, Ct. 1995),
and M.J, v. State, 399 So.2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), all
involve criminal proceedings and challenges to searches and
seizures conducted on school premises. Moreover, these cases
29

III.B.2.

RORY's Argument that Alleged Due
Process Violations Resulted from
Vague and Ambiguous Policies is
Without Merit.

RORY's argument DISTRICT violated due process by
failing to provide a sufficiently clear drug policy, RORY'S
BRIEF, pp. 7-8, 17-18, 22 n.9., 32, contains numerous fatal
flaws, each of which standing alone requires rejection of RORY's
argument.

First, as the trial court determined, RORY did not

plead this issue in his COMPLAINT and therefore it was not
properly before the trial court.

ORDER DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, % III.B., R. 889-890, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, R.
890-891.
Second, and most importantly, DISTRICT'S policy is
clear and unambiguous and was followed in this case.

Contrary to

RORY's claim that several different policies may apply, RORY'S
BRIEF, p. 22 n.9, a clear and specific policy applied and was

clearly indicate actions taken by school officials, even if later
the subject of criminal proceedings, are subject to a lower
constitutional standard than identical actions taken by police,
in direct contradiction of the proposition for which RORY cites
the cases. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980), and
United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979) deal with
the impartiality of the judge in criminal and civil cases.
Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977) is a school
district employee termination case in which the parties giving
the hearing had been publicly bad mouthing the employee.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) involves the
question of when a wife becomes an instrument of the police for
the purposes of the exclusionary rule relating to search and
seizures. Gabrilowitz v. Newmon, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978) is
a student expulsion case where criminal charges are pending at
the time of the hearing.
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followed.

GROVER AFFIDAVIT, f 11 and Exhibit C attached thereto,

R. 437, 463-472.

That policy clearly states no student shall use

drugs--marijuana is specifically mentioned--on any school
sponsored or approved activity.

Id.

The policy states first

time violators will be suspended for ten days and not permitted
to participate in any extra-curricular activities.

Xd.

Thus,

RORY simply fails to establish facts which suggest DISTRICT'S
policy was not clear in this case.
Third, courts have not applied constitutional vagueness
doctrines to cases involving short suspensions.

In Sullivan v.

Houston Independent School Dist., 3 07 F. Silpp. 132 8 (S.D. Texas
1969), the court held vagueness and overbreadth doctrine applied
to standards of student conduct only in exceptional
circumstances.

Xd. at i

These "fi mdamental concepts of

constitutional law apply only to rules of student conduct the
violation of which could result in expulsion or suspension for a
substantial period of time.

it is beyonI :iispute

RORY was suspended for only a ten days which is a short
suspension.

Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.

Fourth, RORY does not advance a vagueness or
overbreadth argument that has been recognized by any court in the
context of a 10-day suspension.

DISTRICT does not dispute courts

have, in circumstances un] ike those in the case at hand, applied
constitutional doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth to student
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disciplinary policies as a factor to find due process violations.
All those cases, however, involve challenges to the wording of
specific provisions of a specific policy that are allegedly
unclear.19

Here, RORY does not make any such argument, and for

good reason; DISTRICT policy at issue is crystal clear.

See

GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 11 and Exhibit C attached thereto, R. 437,
463-472.

Indeed, RORY simply attached five alleged policies to

RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO and baldly asserted it was not known
exactly which policy was in effect at the time of RORY's
suspension.

RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO, % 6, p. 2, R. 207;

Exhibits for Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, lale, R. 233-348; RORY'S BRIEF, p. 22 n.9.

The DISTRICT pointed

out there was no citation to support this allegation, thus it
lacked foundational support and under the rules of evidence was
improperly before the trial court.

DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING

RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT, % I.A., R. 582-583.20

On the other

19

Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Oradell, 42 5 U.S.
610 (1976) is about a municipal ordinance requiring advance
notice to police before soliciting in the city. McCall v. State,
354 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1978) is a First Amendment case. State v.
Martinez, 538 P.2d 521 (Wash. 1975) is a criminal statute case.
Mitchell v. King, 363 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1975) is about the vagueness
of a statute authorizing a Board of Education to expel a student
because there was no distinction between on and off school
property; Bertens v. Stewart, 453 So.2d 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) is a state statute case.
20

In paginating the file the clerk of the trial court
mistakenly failed to number page number 3 of DISTRICT'S MEMO
OPPOSING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
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hand, the DISTRICT, by admissable evidence, established the only
policy at issue was policy "FGAB".

GROVER AFFIDAVIT, 1 11, R.

437, 463-472.
Fifth, courts do not intermix compliance with policies
and procedural due process violations.

It is only when a

disregard for a policy results in a procedure which itself
impinges on due process that a due process violation occurs.
Goodrich v. Newport News School Board, 743 P.2d 225 (4th Cir.
1984); Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976); Hartfield
v. East Grand Rapids Public Schools, 960 F. Supp. 1259, 1263
(W.D. Mich. 1997).
Finally, even assuming the constitutional vagueness
requirements could apply in this context, they have been met in
this case.

Courts have held without exception t.-..:_ "school

disciplinary regulations need not be drawn with the same
precision as a criminal statute."
H i g h S c h o o l D i s t . , 8fM

I . nUpp

Sullivan, 307 F. Supp. at ±JM4.

Weimerslage v. Maine Township

I .(

II

Ill M

ll l

19l^i;

To satisfy due process, school

rules need only "reasonably inform the student what specific
conduct is prescribed."

See Sullivan, 3 07 F. Supp. at 1344.

Given this standard, RORY's claim fails.

RORY does not and

cannot claim, and identifies no facts showing DISTRICT'S drug
policy did not reasonably apprise hini *
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conduct was

prohibited.21

To prevail on this claim RORY would have to show

he did not know DISTRICT policy precluded the use of drugs on a
band trip--this position borders on the preposterous.
III.C.

THERE IS NO NEED TO APPLY A BALANCING TEST
IN THIS CASE.

RORY urges this court to expand Goss because Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, (1976) imposed an additional three-prong
balancing test.

RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 15, 18-19, 23, 33-34, 37;

TRANSCRIPT, R. 938 at p. 26.

This suggestion to follow Mathews,

and a host of cases in other contexts,22 is an invitation to err.
21

The facts of record are to the contrary. First, it is
clear DISTRICT policy clearly identifies the conduct that is
proscribed. GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 11 and Exhibit C attached
thereto, R. 437, 463-472. Moreover, the student handbook,
attached as Exhibit Id to RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO, was
distributed to every student and indicates drug use is prohibited
and it could result in suspension or expulsion. See GROVER
AFFIDAVIT, % 7 and Exhibit B attached thereto, R. 436, 449-462.
In addition, the handbook, including the drug related policy, was
explained to all students, including RORY, by advisors at the
beginning of the school year. Jd. As an informal or even oral
rule does not violate due process as long as it fairly apprises a
student of the conduct that is proscribed, it is clear DISTRICT'S
policies have no constitutional defect in this case. See New
Braunfels Indep. School Dist. v. Armke, 658 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex.
App. 10th Dist. 1983).
22

While purporting to aid the court in defining the due
process required in this case, RORY ignores cases dealing
expressly with student suspensions of ten days or less and
focuses instead on cases discussing due process in entirely
different contexts. For example, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323,
defines the process due an individual being denied social
security disability benefits. Courts have expressly "decline[d]
the invitation to apply the Mathews balancing test" in a ten day
drug suspension case. Paredes, 864 F.2d at 428-29. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) deals with
the due process the law requires be provided to beneficiaries of
trust fund before they can be deprived of property in the trust.
34

RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 33-35.

A review of case law, and specifically

Mathews, establishes the "balancing test" existed long before
Goss and Mathews were decided.

Morrissev v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471

(1972); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cafeteria workers v. McElroy, 367
U.S.

886 (1961)

In Mathews the Supreme Court said, "More

precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of
the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of distinct factors.'

The court then lists the

three-prong balancing test RORY advocates.
334-335 (emphasis added)
the balancing test.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at

Ii i Gos s the Court expressly applied

Goss, 419 U.S. at 579-584.

The Court

[S]tudents facing suspension . . . must be given
some kind of notice and afforded some kind of
hearing . . . [T] he timing and content of the notice
and the nature of the hearing will depend on
appropriate
accommodations
of
the
competing
interests involved. The student's interest is to
avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion from the
educational process, with all of its unfortunate
consequences.
The Due Process Clause will not
shield him from suspensions properly imposed . . .
The risk of error is not at all trivial, and it
should be guarded against if that may be done
without prohibitive cost or interference with the
educational process
The difficulty is that
our schools are vast and complex. Some modicum of
discipline and order is essential if the educational
function is to be performed.
Events calling for
discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes
require immediate, effective action. Suspension is
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S . 54b (196b) , :i i ivolved tl le cii le p r o c e s s
required to terminate a parent's rights.
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considered not only to be a necessary tool to
maintain order but a valuable educational device.
The
prospect
of
imposing
elaborate
hearing
requirements in every suspension case is viewed with
great concern . . . .
Goss, 419 U.S. at 579-580 (emphasis original).
After identifying and balancing the competing interests
the Court set forth what due process is required:
[D]ue process requires, in connection with a
suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be
given oral or written notice of the charges against
him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to
present his side of the story . . . There need be
no delay between the time notice is given and the
time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases
the disciplinarian may informally discuss the
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after
it has occurred.
Id. at 581-582 (emphasis added).
The court rejected the call for more formalized
procedures for suspensions of ten days or less.

The court

concluded:
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause
to require that hearings in connection with short
suspensions must afford the student the opportunity
to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine
witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own
witness to verify his version of the incident . .
[t]o impose in each such case even truncated
trial-type
procedures
might
well
overwhelm
administrative facilities in many places and by
diverting resources, cost more than it would save
in educational effectiveness, . . . [and make
suspensions] too costly as a regular disciplinary
tool and destroy its effectiveness as a part of the
teaching process.
Id. at 583.
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The balancing test, contrary to RORY's assertion, was
not new to Mathews.

Goss applied the balancing test

announcing what due process requires for a ten day suspension and
this court should, as did the trial court, 23 apply the Goss
standard.
In addition to the reasons given in Goss for limiting
due process requirements when a ten day suspension is involved,
there is a pressing need, :i i 1 ti ICE • :i ntei : < E st: : f tl le orderly
operation of a school, that educators have certainty about due
process requirements.

The flexible weighing and balancing of

competing interests approach asserted

pv 24 Wciilci result in a

case by case evaluation in which the educator could, at best,
only attempt to guess what a court, after the fact, would require
for due process.
XII.D.

GOSS DOES NOT REQUIRE RORY BE PROVIDED
WITH NOTICE OF THE RULES AND PROCEDURES,
HOWEVER RORY WAS GIVEN NOTICE OF 'THE TIME
AND PLACE OF THE HEARING REQUIRED BY GOSS

RORY'S BRIEF, p. 4 '-J , cites a state statute and a
DISTRICT policy to support ' le claim, RORY • as i lot properly
notified of the time and place of his "hearing".

While there are

many answers to this argument, some of which are elsewhere in

23

Ruling on Defendants 1 Motion for Summary Judgment dated
July 1, 1997, R. 804-806; Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, R. 814-816; SUMMARY JUDGMENT, R. 88 788 8; ORDER DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, R. 888-890.
24

See RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 15, 18, 33-37.
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this brief,25 it is sufficient answer to say RORY never pled a
claim based on violation of state statute or BOARD policy.
process requirements are set forth in Goss.

Due

Those requirements

do not include notice of rules and procedures.

In fact, "There

need be no delay between the time notice is given and the time of
hearing."

Goss 419 U.S. at 582; Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419,

428 (7th Cir. 1997); Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 386 (11th
Cir. 1996); Byrd v. Irmo High School, 468 S.E.2d 861, 867-868
(S.C. 1996).

RORY had notice of the time and place of the

hearing as required by Goss.

In fact, ROGER and RORY were

present but failed to avail themselves of the opportunity.
IV•

RORY DID NOT PRESERVE THE HOME SCHOOLING ISSUE
FOR APPEAL.

Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires RORY to set forth for each issue presented for review a
"(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved
in the trial court; or (B) a statement of grounds for seeking
review of an issue not preserved in the trial court."
App. P. 24 (1998).

RORY argues the DISTRICT'S failure to provide

home schooling services tainted the hearing process.
BRIEF, pp. 2 6-27.

Utah R.

RORY'S

RORY did not allege anything relating to home

schooling in his COMPLAINT.

The only reference RORY makes to

25

See supra, pp. 15-20 for discussion on what is required;
pp. 30-34 for discussion of relationship between procedural due
process and policies.
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home schooling is u n d e r the Statement of Facts section of RORY'S
SUMMARY J U D G M E N T M E M O .
District provided some

It s t a t e s :

"During the suspensio

he

home schooling services t o t h e student.

M r . Grover indicated that h e received daily reports a n d d i d not
hear anything that caused h i m to believe Rory w a s uncooperative
in the home schooling p r o g r a m

RORY'S SUMMARY J U D G M E N T MEMO, p .

8, <h 8, R. 2 1 3 . RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT M E M O then fails to
d i s c u s s , in a n y form, the issue of the HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM.
RORY d i d not raise the HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM at the oral argument
on April 4, 1 9 9 7 . Even w h e n RORY filed the M O T I O N TO A M E N D and
his accompanying First A m e n d e d Complad i it t:l ::i sre i s i 10 mention <
the HOME SCHOOLING CLAIM

26

RORY will undoubtedly argue the HOME

SCHOOLING CLAIM is just part of his due process claim as he has
done with so many other issues.
wrong.

Sucl i a cl laxacterizatd oi i is •

Once again, due process is defined in Goss and home

schooling is not part of the definition.
This is an issue which was ric: »t :i i I the plead ings and was
not presented to the trial court, and RORY has not met the
requirements for this court to review it as an issue first raised
on appeal.

State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utf

appellate court may address an issue first raised on appeal if
appellant established the trial court committed plain error or

26

The Proposed First Amended Complaint
818-823.
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an be found at R.

there are exceptional circumstances).

For these reasons, this

court should refuse to address the home schooling issue.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THERE WAS A
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WITH RESPECT
TO RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION DOES NOT
MEAN THERE WAS SUCH AN ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO
DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.

RORY argues in his brief the trial court erred in
granting the DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION because the court
found there were disputed issues of fact with respect to RORY'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.

RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 41-42.

This argument

falsely assumes the facts necessary to support DISTRICT'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTION are identical to the facts necessary to support
RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.

Pursuant toU.R.C.P. 56, the

trial court found there was undisputed evidence RORY had an
opportunity to be heard.

That supports the SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

A

different fact -- that RORY did not have an opportunity to be
heard -- would have to be found to support a granting of RORY'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.

The trial court found there was

disputed evidence on this point.

Since there was admissible

evidence RORY did have opportunity, which was undisputed, the
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was proper.

Since there was disputed evidence

RORY did not have an opportunity, the ORDER DENYING RORY'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION was also proper.
no genuine factual issue.

In one case there was

In the other there was.

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, % II., R. 887-888; ORDER DENYING RORY'S SUMMARY
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JUDGMENT MOTION, % III., R. 888-890.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED RORY'S MOTION
TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF LYMAN GROVER.

RORY argues GROVER AFFIDAVIT contradicts the GROVER
DEPOSITION about: a) the meeting on May 16, 1996 between GROVER
and ROGER, and b) the alleged dual role GROVER played as
disciplinarian and a law enforcement agent.
The trial court found no inconsistency.
MOTION TO STRIKE, pp. 8-9, R. 891-892.

ORDER DENYING

Regarding the meeting on

May 16, 1996, the GROVER AFFIDAVIT and GROVER DEPOSITION state on
several occasions GROVER invited ROGER into his private office to
discuss the suspension but ROGER was unwilling to discuss the
matter with GROVER and only wanted to pick RORY up and leave.
GROVER DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 40-42; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, % 13,
R. 437-438.27
On the issue of police involvement both indicate: 1)
GROVER recognized from the beginning the conduct of RORY was
criminal and GROVER would be required to notify the police, 2)
the first contact with police was May 16, 1996, 3) GROVER
provided FILLFRED an explanation of what GROVER knew about the
INCIDENT, and 4) GROVER called the students involved in the
INCIDENT to his office and informed them the police had been
notified and that was the reason for the presence of FILLFRED.

27

The original GROVER AFFIDAVIT is found at R. 433-472.
affidavit at R. 513-519 is a copy.
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The

GROVER DEPOSITION, R. 940 at pp. 53-56; GROVER AFFIDAVIT, Hf 6,
9, R. 435-437.28
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING RORY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN
AMENDED COMPLAINT.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the MOTION TO AMEND in which RORY asserted the NEW CLAIMS.
argues otherwise and makes three arguments.
Complaint presented no new causes of action".
45.

RORY

First, "the Amended
RORY'S BRIEF, p.

Second, Rule 15(a) of the U.R.C.P. allows amendment of a

complaint when justice requires.

RORY'S BRIEF, pp. 46-49.

Third, Rule 15(b) of U.R.C.P. allows amendments after trials to
conform the pleadings to the evidence.

RORY'S BRIEF, p.46.

RORY's arguments must fail.
VILA.

RORY'S MOTION TO AMEND ATTEMPTED TO ADD
NEW CLAIMS AND ISSUES.

RORY's characterization of his amendment defies
reality.

If RORY's characterization is correct, there was no

reason to file RORY'S MOTION TO AMEND since a party does not need
to amend his complaint to simply allege additional facts.

The

trial court recognized the true character of RORY'S MOTION TO
AMEND when it stated:
The Court rejects [RORY's] characterization of
the proposed amendments as merely setting forth
28

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
to Strike the Affidavit of Lyman Grover, R. 782-792, sets forth,
side by side, for easy comparison, the testimony of which RORY
complains.
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facts learned in the discovery process.
The
proposed FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT sets forth new
issues (not new discovered facts as [RORY] asserts)
to which [DISTRICT] would be entitled to respond,
conduct discovery and file dispositive motions which
would result in a delay of the final resolution of
this matter.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, 1 2, R. 891. (emphasis added).
In this case RORY alleged the ORIGINAL CLAIM.
COMPLAINT, H 11, R. 3.

The COMPLAINT did not contain the NEW

CLAIMS and the trial court correctly denied RORY's efforts to
expand the issues.

Mitchell v. Palmer, 240 P.2d 970 (Utah 1952)

(prohibiting arguing grounds and issues not pled).

The NEW

CLAIMS were raised for the first time in RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MEMO and, when the DISTRICT objected, then in the Proposed First
Amended Complaint.

RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMO, pp. 14-15, 21-

25, R. 219-220, 226-230; DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING RORY'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, pp. 12-14, R. 591-593; Proposed First Amended
Complaint, R. 818-823.

RORY recognized his dilemma and sought to

characterize his amendment as something other than what it was--a
radical expansion of this lawsuit.29
VII.B.

RORY FAILS TO MEET THE STANDARD OF
U.R.C.P. 15(a).

In Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250 (Utah App.
1992) this court limited the "liberal constrution" of U.R.C.P.

29

Early on the court limited the scope of the discovery
sought by RORY in this lawsuit to the issue pled in the
COMPLAINT. See PROTECTIVE ORDER NO. 1, R. 163-170.
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15(a) when it stated "Utah courts should consider the following
factors in determining whether to allow amendment:

(1) the

timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and
(3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party."
253.

Id. at

Because RORY did not meet all three-prongs, RORY'S MOTION

TO AMEND was properly denied.
VII.B.I.

RORY's Motion for Leave to File
an Amended Complaint was Untimely.

In Swift Stop, in upholding the denial of Swift Stop's
motion to amend, the Court stated,
Utah Appellate courts uphold a trial court's denial
of a motion to amend if the amendment is sought late
in the course of litigation . . . Wight had already
completed his discovery and submitted his motion for
summary judgment when Swift Stop submitted its
motion to amend. Therefore we find the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
to amend."
Id. at 253-254.

RORY claims he did not delay and attempts to

brush Swift Stop aside because the party attempted "to add new
claims 18 months after filing the initial complaint."
BRIEF, p. 46, n. 26, 48.

(emphasis original).

RORY'S

The lapse of time

since filing the complaint is not the sole consideration.

Rather

the time period at which the amendment is sought in relation to
the course of the litigation is important.

See Westley v.

Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (1983) (upholding
trial court's denial of motion to amend because it would have
delayed the trial).

In this case, the trial court found the
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MOTION TO AMEND was "untimely because it was filed approximately
2M months after the discovery cutoff deadline, both parties had
completed extensive discovery, and both parties had filed motions
for summary judgment".

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, f

III.A.l., R. 890-891.
VII.B.2.

RORY Provides No Justification
for Delay.

The second prong of Swift Stop required RORY to justify
the delay.

A denial of a motion to amend is appropriate "if the

movant was aware of the facts underlying the proposed amendment
long before its filing, and if there is no adequate explanation
for the delay."

Swift Stop, 845 P.2d at 253 (emphasis added).

In this case RORY made no effort to explain his delay.

RORY was

aware of the "new facts" long before RORY'S MOTION TO AMEND was
filed.30

In addition, RORY's counsel was provided with access to

the current policies and procedures of the BOARD and the extent
of the involvement of the law enforcement agency early in
discovery.

See DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING MOTION TO AMEND, HH

I.D.-I.E., R. 758-759.

30

This is evident by the fact RORY admits he denied the
charges, through ROGER, on May 13, 1996, See RORY'S MEMO OPPOSING
DISTRICT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT, % 7, p. 4, R. 700, the suspension
notice identified the grounds, and he filed the COMPLAINT the day
after the suspension. The COMPLAINT alleges "The basis for the
suspension was Plaintiff's alleged possession of and/or use of
marijuana during student activity." COMPLAINT, % 8, R. 2-3.
45

Even in the light most favorable to RORY he knew of the
new issues no later than December 17, 1996, when he took GROVER's
deposition.

At this time RORY knew discovery cutoff was December

27, 1996, the disposition motion deadline was January 31, 1997,
and trial was March 18-19, 1997, SCHEDULING ORDER, R. 159-160,
and yet he made no effort to file the MOTION TO AMEND until March
6, 1997.

RORY failed the second-prong of the test.
VII.B.3.

DISTRICT Would Be Prejudiced By
Allowing RORY To Amend His
COMPLAINT.

The trial court found the DISTRICT would suffer grave
injustice and prejudice if RORY was allowed to amend his
COMPLAINT.

The trial court stated,

Allowing [RORY] to file the FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
would prejudice the [DISTRICT] in that [DISTRICT]
would incur additional expense in investments of
time and resources to respond to and conduct
discovery on the new allegations contained in the
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, all of which could have
been avoided if [RORY'S MOTION TO AMEND] had been
timely filed.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND, % IV.A.3., p. 8, R. 891.
RORY contends the DISTRICT would not have suffered any
prejudice because the "issues raised in the amended complaint
were apparent from the discovery, particularly from the
deposition testimony."
argument.

RORY'S BRIEF, p. 48.

This is a novel

RORY apparently believes because the GROVER DEPOSITION

included mostly irrelevant and immaterial matters in relationship
to the ORIGINAL CLAIM, the DISTRICT was on notice of the NEW
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CLAIMS and under an affirmative obligation to read RORY's mind as
what he intended to do with the "new facts", and prepare the
appropriate defense and RORY was entitled to try any issue to
which the fact may apply even if not pled.

The trial court

refused, as should this court, to impose such a novel requirement
on a party to litigation.
VII.C.

RULE 15(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

RORY argues since U.R.C.P. 15(b) allows complaints to
be amended even after trial to conform to evidence, the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the MOTION TO AMEND.
RORY'S BRIEF, p. 46.

There are two main flaws to this argument.

First, the MOTION TO AMEND was filed before trial, not after.
Second, U.R.C.P. 15(b) allows amendments to conform to the
evidence "when issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties."
(1998).

U.R.C.P. 15(b)

In this case DISTRICT has never consented, expressly or

implied, to the trial of issues not raised in the pleadings.
DISTRICT'S MEMO OPPOSING MOTION TO AMEND, R. 756-779; DISTRICT'S
MEMO OPPOSING RORY'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT, % II.B., R. 591-594.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Seventh
Judicial District Court of San Juan County, State of Utah, should
be affirmed.
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